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Abstract. Neuroscience is one of the most propulsive of all sciences and very often, 
directly or not, it tries to answer the question: What is man? However, neuroscientific 
research does not acknowledge the concept of man as a unity of body and soul. The 
modern scientific research paradigm therefore rests on physicalism, while theologians 
are turning towards non-reductive physicalism. In this paper, we will highlight a few 
key points of the theory of philosopher and theologian Nancey Murphy, which is based 
on the deconstruction of Aquinas’s thought about the human soul and its reduction to 
the physical. We aim to show that she neglected the full scope of Aquinas teachings. In 
the second part of this paper, for the scientific paradigm of humans we shall propose 
new-old hylomorphism, and try to complement certain points of such a system with 
modern neuroscientific views. The aim of this work is to offer advice for the interdis-
ciplinary cooperation between neuroscience, philosophy and theology alongside the 
guidelines of Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism.
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Introduction
Are we the witnesses of the final overcoming of the concept of the soul 
thanks to neuroscientific studies of the brain? Do the fascinating neural 
structures reveal the complete truth about the human being? Or does it 
happen to be another hastily made conclusion, as all too often happens 
with scientific expectations?
Neuroscience is one of the most propulsive of all sciences that explores 
the brain and the nervous system, and very often, directly or not, tries to 
answer the question: What is man? However, neuroscientific research does 
not acknowledge the concept of man as a unity of body and soul. Even 
theological attempts at interpretation and integration of neuroscientific 
empirical findings avoid hylomorphism. The very thought that the man 
be seen as a unity of body and soul is labelled as dualism – an already 
surpassed philosophical attitude that has no place in science. First, how 
shall we explain the effect of a non-material soul on the material body? 
If energy is required to transfer information from the soul to the body, 
from where does the immaterial soul draw that energy? In other words, 
dualism calls into question the basic physical law of conservation of energy. 
Secondly, if the occurrence and effects of all human activities, including the 
greater spiritual abilities, can be explained and understood based on bodily 
structure and functions, with the central role of the brain, then the soul is 
an unnecessary addition, a relic of times gone past. The modern scientific 
research paradigm therefore rests on physicalism, while theologians are 
turning towards non-reductive physicalism.
Not infrequently we can find that in neuroscientific texts Saint Thomas 
Aquinas is cited as an example of speaking about man as “composed of 
a spiritual and corporeal substance” (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 75 pr), and whose 
presentation was clear and admirable for its time, but today has been 
overcome. In the first part of this paper, based on an example of one such 
study that builds a new image of man as pertains to the criticism of Thomas 
Aquinas, we will expose the critical reflection of the American philosopher 
and theologian Nancey Murphy. Neither will we go into detail or herein 
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interpret her facts, but we will highlight a few key points of the theory that 
is based on the deconstruction of Aquinas’s thought. In the second part of 
this work, by pointing to gaps in the understanding the teachings of Thomas 
Aquinas as well as pointing to the possibility of different interpretations 
of neuroscientific research, we will show how the physicalist framework 
within which Murphy operates is not sufficient if we want to understand 
the human being in all its dimensions. So, we must ask ourselves: Is there 
another frame besides physicalism and Cartesian dualism that is convenient 
for an understanding of human beings, without being therein reduced to 
a certain characteristic or organ?
Therefore, in the third part on the scientific paradigm of humans we 
shall propose new-old hylomorphism, and certain points of such a system 
to try to complement it with modern neuroscientific views. The aim of this 
work is to offer suggestions for the interdisciplinary cooperation between 
neuroscience, philosophy and theology alongside the precept of Aristote-
lian-Thomistic hylomorphism.
1. Nancey Murphy and non-reductive physicalism
Nancey Murphy, who does research on the relationship of science and 
theology, is a prominent figure concerning non-reductive physicalism. 
When investigating relations between the soul and the brain, she retains 
that Aquinas is still important, but, thanks to the influence of neurosci-
ence, it is becoming increasingly clear “that the functions and attributes 
once attributed to the soul or mind is better understood as functions of 
the brain” (Murphy 2006, 40/56). It is considered that a challenge to the 
Christian faith does not come as much from Darwin’s theory of evolution 
as from the development of physics and neuroscience, which significantly 
influences the formation and understanding of the human nature. Yet, 
Murphy believes that a study of the brain will never be able to establish 
proof that besides the body an immaterial soul does not exist. However, 
she holds that Biblical studies and neuroscience point towards a physicalist 
understanding of the human person. “Humans are not hybrids of matter and 
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something else, they are purely physical organisms” (Ibid. 69). Of course, 
this is not a new position concerning Biblical studies (Brajčić 1976, 226). 
What is new is that this understanding of man is now defended with the 
help of neuroscientific views. For a number of available sources that could 
serve as a counter-argument, I suggest article from Paul Flaman, which takes 
into account Murphy’s position and neuroscience research, and defends 
the position that man has an immortal soul (Flaman 2008). Also, it should 
be noted that Murphy does not question the existence of God and believes 
that neuroscientific research will never give evidence to the question of 
whether God exists or not (Ibid. 68).
As for Aquinas’s understanding of soul, Murphy says that the soul is 
first and foremost “the life principle”. But what makes something alive 
in modern science is a question that biology deals with, which, as well as 
the other sciences, grasps things in the universe “as fitting (them) into 
a hierarchy; not as a medieval chain of being, but rather a hierarchy of 
complexity” (Ibid, 56). Murphy also remarks that in the early 20th century 
there was a philosophical dispute between Vitalists and Emergentists. The 
first followed Aristotle’s understanding of reality and argued that there 
must be one vital force that directs the formation of the body and thus is 
credited for the organism that is alive. The other considered that the proper 
functioning of a suitably complex entity was enough for it to be alive. “Life 
is an emergent property that is dependent on complex organization, not on 
an additional entity or non-material stuff. So this was the last gasp of the 
ancient and medieval idea of the soul as a life force” (Ibid. 57).
Murphy then moves on to the interpretation of the teachings of Thomas 
Aquinas on the soul. The first is the vegetative soul which has three powers: 
growth, feeding and reproduction (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 78, a. 2 co). But, 
biologists have shown the powers attributed to the vegetative soul to be 
on the physical level of the individual. Murphy then moves on to the animal 
or the sensitive soul, which has the following powers: locomotion, appetite, 
sensation, and emotion. All powers Murphy breaks down in a manner that 
is based on physical structure and its requirements for the individual to 
survive, and particularly emphasises the role of the brain and the branched 
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nervous system (Murphy 2006, 59–60). Concerning consciousness, according 
to Murphy, the interaction of the human nervous system to the rest of the 
body and the environment is “the seat of consciousness” (Murphy 1998, 131).
Murphy further points out that Aquinas, along with citing the five 
external senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) (Aquinas 1947, Iª, 
q. 78, a. 3 co), also stated the four interior powers of the “sensitive part” 
(sensus communis, phantasia, vis aestimativa, and vis memorativa – “The 
common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.” 
Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 78, a. 4 co), by which the medieval author explains the 
cognitive skills like a contemporary scientists and neuroscientists. Murphy 
points out that in neuroscience the important issue is how the brain rec-
ognizes when some event/person/pattern is repeated (Murphy 2006, 62). 
For Murphy, it is this knowledge that is important for an understanding of 
Aquinas’s phantasia in such a way that it represents “the re-activation of 
such an assembly that accounts for the memory of the original set of stimuli” 
(Ibid. 63). The next contact point between Aquinas and neuroscience is 
achieved through sensus communis, which is in science is called “the binding 
problem”. The binding problem refers to one of the central features of the 
structure of consciousness – the unity. “We experience objects and events 
in consciousness. These events and objects are composites of different 
stimuli and their various features. [...] How is such a ‘unity of phenomenal 
contents’ of consciousness constituted?” (Northoff 2014, 119–120) Unlike 
neuroscientists, philosophers are concerned about “a unity that is prior to 
and occurs independently of the contents” (Ibid. 120). Aquinas was also 
aware of this problem, but he did not postulate a faculty of consciousness, 
but a faculty where all information comes together – the sensus communis. 
(Pasnau 2004, 199).
The rational soul, which is characteristic of human beings, belongs not 
only to the passive and active intellect, but also the will. As for the powers 
of the intellect, they are not now so well understood in the neuroscience. 
Murphy claims that these powers are dependent on the phenomenon of 
language, for which the neural patterns are very well researched (Murphy 
2006, 66).
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Murphy holds that the will is the centre of the moral abilities that are 
in turn connected to select areas of prefrontal cortex. On this basis, Murphy 
concluded that “what Thomas described as the ‘appetite for the good’ appears 
to depend directly on localizable brain functions” (Ibid. 67). She sees the 
problem of morality as closely connected with rationality: how it came to 
be that humans reach decisions based on moral principles (Ibid. 73). In the 
end, Murphy suggests “that what we really want when we want free will is 
some measure of autonomy from biological drives and social forces. But not 
a great deal.” (Ibid. 109) Murphy thinks that our brain processes, which are 
developed, organized, and strengthen with symbolic language and inclusion 
in society, enable powers that are far greater than in any animal, and guide 
us toward goals of rationality, morality and freedom (Ibid. 109).
In terms of the soul, as a part of a man that after death first goes to 
heaven, Murphy believes that Christians should think about the future 
life rather in the context of the resurrection of the body, as opposed to in 
a context where the soul goes to heaven. To enhance evidence for such 
a belief, she asks “what characteristics your soul would have to retain for 
it to be recognizably you who gets to heaven. Your consciousness, your 
memories, your likes and dislikes, perhaps? But, as we have just seen, these 
are all the provinces of brain studies” (Murphy 2006, 69). Murphy dissociates 
herself from the reductionist error that all human capacity is reduced to 
“nothing but” ongoing processes in the brain, and represents the position 
of non-reductive physicalism. While in reductionism, even more higher 
human capacities reduce to “neural firing”; on the other hand, non-reductive 
physicalism, by claiming that there is no existing soul, attempts to explain 
the more complex human abilities, not only with the help of brain processes, 
but also through human social relationships, influences of culture, and also 
through our relationship with God (Ibid. 69).
2. Critical review
We have briefly presented Murphy’s view, but we will try to show why she 
failed to fully grasp Aquinas’s understanding of the human being as a unity 
5(2)/2017 133
N E U RO S C I E N T I F I C F I N D I N G S I N T H E L I G H T O F AQ U I N A S’ U N D E R S TA N D I N G. . .
of body and soul. Also, we aim to show that Murphy’s neuroscientific over-
turning of Aquinas’s understanding of the human being is not convincing 
proof that the soul very likely does not exist. Tom Wolfe also considers that 
the future does not bring Nietzsche’s “God is dead”, but “the soul is the 
dead” (Wolfe 2000). Furthermore, maybe we can use such an undertaken 
neuroscientific overturning, reverse it and interpret it differently – in favour 
of Aquinas’s hylomorphism.
First, let us consider the question of consciousness, which is certainly 
one of the most difficult and most stratified questions of all. It should be 
noted that the issue of consciousness is an extremely important question 
of theological reflection, and is closely related to the soul. “The Church 
affirms that a spiritual element survives and subsists after death, an element 
endowed with consciousness and will, so that the ‘human self’ subsists. 
To designate this element, the Church uses the word ‘soul’, the accepted 
term in the usage of Scripture and Tradition.” (Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith, Letter on Certain Questions concerning Eschatology) 
Murphy has briefly noted indications of a possible physicalist solution, and 
although it is not yet scientifically clear in which way consciousness arises 
from its material basis, for Murphy it’s only a matter of time.
Does the fact that neuroscientists seek neural correlates of consciousness 
put Murphy in the right when she argues that this question will be solved? 
Is the problem of consciousness only a neuroscientific problem? What 
about the fact “that most of our brain operates non-consciously” (Card. 
Cottier and others 2013, 306) and that only “through self-observation, we 
develop some degree of explicit self-knowledge” (Ibid. 307), which implies 
that the subject and his unique verbal reports are of utmost importance 
in understanding consciousness as it appears to us in our everyday life? 
And even if one day neuroscientists demonstrate the neural processes 
involved in the manifestations of the sense of the unity of consciousness, 
it is still far from an understanding of consciousness as a specific human 
phenomenon, which is extremely more complex than the phenomenon of 
being conscious, which is what neuroscientists reduce consciousness to 
in their investigations; such is the case with, for example, director of the 
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Max-Planck-Institute for the brain research in Frankfurt, neuroscientist 
Wolf Singer. “Since consciousness is so difficult to define an attempt will 
be made to avoid this term and rather use the adverb ‘consciously’ and the 
adjective ‘conscious’ in order to further specify particular brain states or 
aspects of a perceptual process. Also, no attempt will be made to address the 
hard problem of consciousness research, the problem to explain the phase 
transition from neuronal processes to the qualia of subjective experience 
(Chalmers, 2000).” (Singer 2013, 54) Also, neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene 
defends the hypotheses that empirical research can completely explain 
consciousness, starting from three basic notions: vigilance, attention and 
conscious access. “Once we clarify how any piece of sensory information can 
gain access to our mind and become reportable, then the insurmountable 
problem of our ineffable experiences will disappear.” (Dehaene 2014, 17) 
Contrary to these approaches, philosophers and theologians provide 
a more comprehensive view. Philosopher David J. Chalmers differentiates 
the so called “easy problems” and “hard problems”. Easy problems of 
consciousness address the issues, such as, “How does the brain process 
environmental stimulation? How does it integrate information?” (Chalmers 
1996, XI–XII) Chalmers holds that these are all important questions, but an 
answer to them does not solve a difficult problem: “Why is all this processing 
accompanied by an experienced inner life?” (Ibid. XII) Furthermore, Karol 
Wojtyla holds that in a “reflexive” consciousness the core of consciousness 
itself is revealed as “that in and through what each person experiences 
himself or herself as the originator of new being, that is, as a free agent, 
endowed with self-determination, self-governance, and self-possession”. 
(Schmitz 2001, 31) There are also interesting attempts that try to take into 
account neuroscience and philosophy, such as one from Georg Northoff 
and “the neurophenomenal hypothesis of consciousness” (Northoff 2014, 
XXXVII). These briefly stated theories show that a reductive account of 
consciousness that relies only on brain studies falls short, and that we 
need to address further issues such as the role of the whole body and 
environment (including God) in understanding consciousness as a specific 
human phenomenon.
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Although Thomas Aquinas did not directly talk about consciousness 
as it is used in contemporary literature, it is certain that when following 
St. Augustine he had a certain understanding (Aquinas 1955–1957, lib. 3, 
cap. 46, n. 8) So, concerning consciousness, it is an extraordinarily complex 
question, which requires interdisciplinary collaboration and viewing the 
human being as a whole, considering the strong and unavoidable notion 
of the unity of consciousness.
Second is the question of passive and active intellect. As relates to highly 
complex mental powers, Murphy puts them in direct dependence on the 
phenomenon of language, which is at the centre of numerous neuroscientific 
works. First, it should be noted that some neuroscientific theories observe 
certain forms of human thought that are not dependent on language (Kraft, 
Gulyás and Poppel 2009, V). Also, there exists a clear attitude towards on 
how biological and philosophical fields think of intellect, which is not con-
tradictory, but rather these attitudes are complementary and go together in 
inquiring about the functions of thinking and the meaning of thought itself. 
Among neuroscientists is alive the idea that human thought is the “crown” 
of evolutionary sophistication and that it is fundamental to answer to the 
question “What is a man?” (Ibid. VI) And Aquinas himself had described 
the human soul, because of the activities and capabilities of the mind, as 
the ultima in nobilitate formarum. “Now the human soul is the highest and 
noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the 
fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no 
share whatever. This power is called the intellect.” (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 76, 
a. 1 co) In conclusion, the question of the human intellect is still open.
Third is the question of free will. This is an issue to which Murphy pays 
a lot more attention in her research area than any other power of the soul. 
However, her position is that free will is associated with certain functions 
of the brain, and how on this issue human beings should be satisfied with 
only a certain measure of freedom. This position is also fundamentally 
determined by the horizon of non-reductive physicalism. As a counter-ar-
gument, together with Haeffner, we can note that in human life there is no 
free self-determination without a share of natural determination. However, 
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concerning this natural determination of human behaviour, we need to think 
of it “as open for the possible self-determination” (Haeffner 2003, 180), open 
towards Aquinas’s notion of beatitude as the causa finalis of human beings. 
Murphy starts from neuronal foundations and builds on this, while Haeffner 
takes an approach from the perspective of “the wonders of freedom” as 
irreducible to the laws of cosmic genesis, phylogeny and ontogeny. Neural 
processes and structures represent natural determinism in the subject, 
which precedes and enables the subject, nevertheless remaining just that. 
In return, the subject takes its assumptions for free self-determination and 
“in the horizon of good, which forms a separate, higher order, in which for 
what was assumed (i.e., natural determinism) gets included and overcome” 
(Ibid. 182).
Before we consider non-reductive physicalism as a framework within 
which Murphy considers the question of man, we need to briefly present 
that there are two ways to approach the body/soul problem: dualism and 
monism. “Dualism defines the union between these two elements, the 
body and the spirit, which we considered equals, as a product of a kind of 
a connection between them, which is being thought either as of mutual 
causality, of any such identity in a deeper union or as coordination. The 
solution of monism consists in the fact that only one of these of the two 
elements – the body or the consciousness – is being attributed the true 
reality. The other element is then ontologically reduced and declared as 
a mere phenomenon.” (Haeffner 2003, 197) Dualism that observes the 
body and soul as two complete realities has the problem of explaining the 
interaction between them. The causality that overcomes the gap between 
the two entities “shall not follow nor merely spiritual and psychological 
nor merely physical laws, but still they need to be causally linked to one 
another – the realities of these two orders. To us such causality otherwise 
has not been known.” (Ibid. 197)
As for monism, if the body is reduced to a phenomenon, then we are 
talking about idealism. If the spirit is reduced, then we are dealing with 
materialism. Presently, the materialistic attitudes are enjoying great pop-
ularity in an attempt to reduce “phenomenal duality of mental and physical 
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in man to a single physical reality as the only ‘true’ reality” (Ibid. 198). The 
physical is what is physically examined and researched, but it’s not purely 
physical research. Haeffner therefore notes that one can be physicalist, 
without much understanding of physics, as well one can be the physicist, 
and would not be able to be a physicalist. Therefore, “physicalism” repre-
sents the metaphysical statement representing that the “physics is only 
reasonable and exhaustive theory of reality.” (Ibid. 198) Today, the problem 
of the body and the soul is narrowing down to the form of naturalism versus 
anti-naturalism. In other words, whether physical theory is about to fully 
understand the essence of man or must we assume that alongside the body 
there is essentially a different soul (consciousness)? Or on the other hand, 
no such presumption should (and must not) be in order. There are numerous 
physicalist solutions.
Haeffner makes a point in claiming that when we think of the relation-
ship of the soul and the body there appears a certain darkness that stands 
against the scientific desire to shed light on and understand everything. “Man 
cannot live in an excessive light in a completely scientifically interpreted 
world.” (Ibid. 204) The darkness that occurs at the limits of the human spirit 
is not the limit to be overcome, but it envelops and carries the human spirit. 
“In this way, non-solvability of the metaphysical problem of the soul and 
the body might prove to be something of an essence of a man.” (Ibid. 204)
Furthermore, as for monism, here we’ve listed Patrick Becker’s review, 
who divided it on the mental and physical. Mental monism conceives the 
physical as a mental construct or believes that the physical results from the 
mental. As for physical monism, which gives priority to the physical world, 
it is branched into: a) Reductive physicalism – mental can be reduced to 
physical; b) Eliminative materialism – mental simply does not exist, it is an 
invention of the brain; c) Non-reductive physicalism – the mental cannot be 
reduced, and goes beyond the physical, thus, the consciousness is recognized 
with certain autonomy, which includes an independent causal efficacy. 
Non-reductive physicalism uses the idea of the emergence to clarify how 
from the physical has formed some kind of awareness with its own laws. 
Besides the monistic and dualistic positions, Becker stated the overcoming of 
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the dualistic thinking. It is an attitude which respects the question of whether 
the problem of the brain and consciousness is at all solvable for people – is 
it simply beyond our means? So it seems that the problem of knowing the 
natural, non-dualistic solution is one that cannot be found. Therefore, 
Becker believes that no single approach can answer all philosophical and/
or natural science issues, and that maybe we should re-examine the very 
conditions of the debate. (Patrick Becker 2015, 43–87)
Having stated that, we return to Murphy and non-reductive physicalism 
where the basic assumption is that mental processes are caused by or emerge 
from a physical process during evolutionary processes. But, non-reductive 
physicalism faces several difficulties. First, we may speak of the violation of 
a fundamental principle of causality which posits that no effect can be greater 
in perfection than its cause: “the greater is not brought about by the lesser, for 
nothing acts outside its species” (Aquinas 1947, IIIª, q. 79, a. 2 ad. 3). In other 
words, the neural structures, processes, impulses and chemical reactions in the 
brain, cannot cause higher mental properties. In his critique of non-reductive 
physicalism, Derek S. Jeffreys rightly directs us to Norris Clarke, who claims 
“that the mere fact that a higher level of being does, in fact, emerge in a time 
sequence after a lower level, and at least in part out of it, in no way implies that 
the later is fully explained by the earlier. This would be to fall into the famous 
fallacy: post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this). This 
is most important when seeking a philosophical explanation of evolution in 
our cosmos.” (Clarke 2001, 194) The causal principle permits the occurrence 
of emergent properties, but Jeffreys points out that although lower-enter 
entities can produce certain characteristics of a system, these same qualities 
cannot qualitatively exceed such lower-enter entities in perfection. “Unless 
we show that events at the neurological level have the adequate efficient 
causality to produce mental activity, no amount of research in neuroscience 
and cognitive science will advance Murphy’s research program.” (Jeffreys 
2004, 205–225. For Murphy’s response: Murphy 2004).
Furthermore, another problem with Murphy’s methodology is that she 
tries to understand the human being starting from individual powers and 
not from the understanding of a man as a whole, which is different from the 
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sum of parts (or organs). This approach is also known as the “mereological 
fallacy in neuroscience”, the error of many neuroscientific works. “Aristotle’s 
point is that we must not lose sight of the initially more known whole that 
is presupposed in all theoretical inquiries into its parts.” (De Haan and 
Meadows 2013, 213–230)
Did Aquinas also commit the “mereological fallacy”? Yes and no. First, 
“yes”. Since for Aquinas, “action belongs to the composite, as does existence” 
(Aquinas 1947, Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 3), the powers of the soul are known through 
their acts (Ibid. Iª, q. 77, a. 3 co. / Iª, q. 77, a. 1 ad 7). Robert Pasnau claims 
that this is “a key principle of Aquinas’s methodology: in understanding 
the soul, one works one’s way in from the external action to the internal 
capacity that explains the action, and eventually to the nature of soul itself”. 
(Pasnau 2004, 9) And this is in line with the particularity of neuroscientific 
investigations that deals with particular actions and underlying neural 
processes, but with one crucial difference – their end is not the soul or 
unity of the whole.
On the other hand, Aquinas did not commit the “mereological fallacy” 
because his “Tractatus de homine” is incorporated in the initially more known 
whole – in the broader metaphysical understanding of the human being as 
imago Dei, with his final cause – beatitude (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 2, a. 1 ad 1) 
and cognoscendo et amando Deum (Ibid. Iª–IIae q. 1 a. 8 co). “When we 
understand the purpose of human life, we see what the essential features 
of a human being are.” (Pasnau 2004, 21–22) Of course, the formal cause 
of the human being (soul) and final cause of the human being (beatitude) 
is not within the scope of neuroscientific investigations.
3. The Question of Soul
As the last item in this “critical review” of the paper, we deal with Murphy’s 
understanding of the soul as “the life principle”. “I answer that, To seek the 
nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first prin-
ciple of life of those things which live: for we call living things ‘animate,’ [*i.e. 
having a soul], and those things which have no life, inanimate’.” (Aquinas 
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1947, Iª, q. 75, a. 1 co) Murphy takes the notion of “the life principle” and 
simply equates it with the horizon of the biological understanding of life and 
the conditions that are needed for it in the hierarchy of complexity. However, 
this is pure reductionism, because the life in us is not only biological life, 
but in an analogous way we also have an intellectual and moral life that 
presupposes biological life. “The intentional and transcendental character 
of our knowledge both preserves and deeply changes our biological life.” 
(Campodonico, at: www3.nd.edu/~maritain/)
Aquinas’s understanding of “the life principle” takes place opposite an 
understanding of the philosophers of old (antiqui philosophi) who believed 
that life has originated in a body, because only bodies are real things and 
so the soul is also something corporeal (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 75, a. 1 co). 
Aquinas does not deny that the body cannot be the principle of life, “as 
the heart is the principle of life and an animal” (Ibid. Iª, q. 75, p. 1), but 
the main assertion is that the soul was the first origin of life, that the soul 
gives a reality (actus) to the body. Therefore, maybe we could say that in 
some sense Murphy takes the position of the philosophers of old. “Aquinas 
thinks that these figures went wrong not just because they disbelieved in 
spiritual entities like God, angels, and the human soul, but – more basically 
– because they had the wrong metaphysics, even with respect to the natural 
world that was their focus. [...] Aquinas does hold that the ancients erred 
by postulating only a material cause (see InMet VIII.4.1737); it is in that 
sense, most properly, that we might refer to the ancients as materialists.” 
(Pasnau 2004, 30–31) Aquinas cites St. Augustine when he says that it’s about 
such individuals who hold the materiality of the soul, because they do not 
know how otherwise to describe any nature but with the help of imaginary 
pictures of corporeal things (Aquinas 1947, I, q. 75, p. 2). This is the point 
where comes to the fore the prominent contemporary understanding of man 
through the frame of non-reductive physicalism. In this context, there is 
no place for the soul, for the origination of mental activity; which was for 
Aquinas both incorporeal and subsistent. “I answer that, It must necessarily 
be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, 
is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent.” (Aquinas 1947, I, q. 75, 2)
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4. Hylomorphism: New-old anthropology  
informed by neuroscientific findings
Attempts to reconcile the neurosciences, philosophy and theology have been 
mainly led by the image of man framed with physicalism, like in Murphy’s 
work. If we don’t want to accept physicalism, it seems that we are only left 
with Cartesian dualism. But, that also cannot be acceptable for catholic 
thinkers. It looks like we are stuck and whatever direction in investigation 
we take “we will be unable to articulate the metaphysical underpinnings of 
a philosophical anthropology that does justice both to our obvious dignity 
and distinctiveness as human beings and to our equally obvious continuity 
with other animals and, indeed, with the rest of the physical universe”. 
(Freddoso, at: www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/soul.htm)
In the philosophy of mind, where the Cartesian res cogitans and res 
extensa (or in this case mental and brain capacities) still direct understanding 
of the human being, hylomorphism could be “a salutary alternative for 
understanding reality in neither physicalist nor dualist terms” (Gasser 2010, 
48). In that context, Gasser also states that “proponents of the Aristotelian 
approach argue that the mind-body problem as most persistent Cartesian 
legacy plaguing modern philosophy can be overcome, if Aristotelian onto-
logical categories are re-introduced in modern philosophical discussion.” 
(Ibid. 48) Runggaldier similary claims that Aristotelian hylemorphism, which 
is neither physicalistic/naturalistic nor dualistic, is an alternative that “allows 
for a conception of ourselves compatible with the assumption of diachronic 
personal identity, indexicality and agent causality” (Runggaldier 2006, 221).
The idea of the fundamental unity of man, known as hylomorphism, 
for Calvo has been ignored for centuries, even though it is the understand-
ing of unity “which needs not to be explained in terms of an addition or 
interaction of elements, but which explains the elements in terms of the 
line of reciprocal reflection (horizon) of two metaphysical conditions that 
cannot be thought of apart from each other (i.e. matter and form). This is 
the only serious attempt in the whole history of the mind-body problem that 
comes close to an evaluation of the inner spiritual principle of man without 
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a priori separating it from the body, or reducing it to a sheer outcome of 
brain processes.” (Calvo 1992, 158) There are different understandings of 
hylomorphism, just to mention the one defended by Jaworski. “Hylomor-
phism claims that individuals consist of materials that are structured or 
organized in various ways. You and I are not mere collections of physical 
particles; we are collections of physical particles with a certain organization 
or structure. That structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle.” 
(Jaworski 2011, 269) Unlike Jaworski’s structure principle, following Aristo-
telian-Thomistic hylomorphism, we hold that this principle in the human 
being is the soul (anima forma corporis), incorporeal and subsistent, which 
is created by God (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 75, a. 6 ad 1). 
In opening discourse on the natural sciences applying hylomorphism, 
we support Jacques Maritain’s claim that there is a distinction between 
philosophy as a dianoetic science and the experimental sciences as perinoetic 
sciences. But, we don’t think that hylomorphism, as dianoetic knowledge 
for Maritain, has any reception to gain from the scientific community 
(Savard 2007, 43). Similarly, Etienne Gilson thought that it is not possible to 
propose to modern science the truth of hylomorphism as a hypothesis that 
is scientifically valid (Ibid. 44). Contrary to Maritain and Gilson, we hold 
that hylomorphism has something to offer to modern science. As opposed 
to developing the “anthropology of the cerebral subject” (Vidal 2007, 4), 
where in the centre of focus is a man reduced to capabilities and functions 
of the brain, in what follows we will try to rethink the hylomorphic notion 
of the human being. We have a true opportunity in the human history, as 
is rightly put by Sorondo, because we have a truly human possibility to 
connect and complement two sides: neuroscientific studies of neuronal 
structures and functions, and philosophical self-reflecting descriptions of 
our own experience (Sorondo 2007, 154–155).
We claim that certain philosophical anthropologies have already pre-
determined the horizon of research and, therefore, neuroscience achieve-
ments, if understood in these terms, in advance have a limited field of 
interpretation. Our further agenda in this paper is to provide evidence 
that a different initial anthropological framework or just being open to 
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different frameworks, probably would have offered a different interpretation 
of the neuroscientific research findings. Here are two examples involving 
Aquinas. First, the article from Larrivee and Gini dealing with “habitus 
operativus bonus” and neuroplasticity, in which authors concluded that 
“in his unified view of nature Aquinas offers landmarks circumscribing 
lower level events, the broad outlines of which serve in clarifying what 
the details must conform to, but not identifying the materials by which 
the paths to these landmarks are structured” (Larrivee and Gini 2014, 3 / 
For more interesting multidisciplinary approaches from neuroscience and 
philosophy, see also: Bernacer, Lombo and Murillo 2015). Second, American 
biologist, theoretical neuroscientist and philosopher Walter J. Freeman in 
2008 published an article of surprising title: “Nonlinear Brain Dynamics 
and Intention According to Aquinas”. In brief, nonlinear dynamics is derived 
from chaos theory, which seeks to understand the complex behaviour in 
certain systems. Here it is tried to reconcile two apparently contradictory 
behaviours: randomness and determinism (Hilborn 2001, 3). It is precisely 
that nonlinear brain dynamics deals with the self-organization in complex 
systems, where constantly appears the new activity patterns (Freeman 
2000, 6). Freeman believes that people and animals continuously raise and 
maintain an understanding of the world by using small pieces of sensory 
information. Studies of nonlinear brain dynamics have shown that this takes 
place in such a way that the brain imagines future opportunities, then seeks 
and use sensory stimulations to choose from between them the one option 
that will take them to the previously decided actions. “All that we know 
we have constructed within ourselves from the unintelligible fragments 
of energy impacting our senses as we move our bodies through the world.” 
(Freeman 2008, 207) Freeman believes there is no better a philosophical 
system than that of Thomas Aquinas, which responds to new discoveries in 
domain of the brain nonlinear dynamics. Our author finds a key element in 
Aquinas’s Question 79 (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 79), in which he emphasized the 
unity of the self, and reiterated that the form in material things is replaced 
by the structures in the brain (Freeman 2008, 222). The very process of the 
transition from the material to the phantasm for Freeman is the key for 
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understanding why Aquinas’s notion of intention is important for nonlinear 
neural dynamics. Freeman points out that he does not know of any other 
philosophical system that so effectively depicts “the neurobiological sub-
strates interface between matter and mind” (Freeman 2008, 222).
Now we need to address Aquinas’s understanding of the human being 
and hylomorphism. The unity of the whole human being is a central issue 
for Aquinas. The human being is not primarily seen as a complex physical 
system plus a soul, but as a unum simpliciter. The human being is a unity 
that acts as a whole – the soul and body as one. That is why to understand 
a living organism we need to comprehend it on a higher level, where an 
organism is seen as a unified substance (Pasnau 2004, 99). The soul is 
something more than “a placeholder for whatever it is that gives life to 
living things” (Ibid. 99), more than a collection of powers. “Beyond these 
discrete functions of nutrition, sensation, and intellection, the soul has 
the more basic function of accounting for the unity of a living organism.” 
(Ibid. 99) Another angle of looking at the notion of the soul and unity is 
the openness of the human being to the world. Here we follow Aristotle in 
saying that “the soul is in a way all existing things” (Aristotle 1931, 431b 
21). To be all…for a human being means to have the possibility to relate 
and to know everything that surrounds him. Relating and knowing is not 
made possible only by the brain and neuronal networks. All the parts of 
the body (hands, legs, neck, organs…) in their unity enable openness and 
in this openness the unity of the organism is grounded. Openness opens 
the relation between the organism and the world. This relation is funda-
mentally dynamic because humans and world mutually affect each other. 
This relational dynamism, on the part of the human being, is enabled by 
the soul that unites all the parts of an organism. We can know and relate 
to things only as a united being. Furthermore, following Ratzinger, we have 
capacity for an open existence and we can relate to God, and this relatedness 
“constitutes what is deepest in man’s being. It is nothing other than what 
we call ‘soul’ (Ratzinger 1988, 155).” The more open we are, the more are 
we ourselves. „A being is the more itself the more it is open, the more it is 
in relationship. And that in turn will leads us to realize that it is the man 
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who makes himself open to all being, in its wholeness and in its Ground, and 
becomes thereby a ‘self,’ who is truly a person.” (Ibid. 155) What also needs 
to be put forth, in our effort to open a dialogue with the natural sciences, is 
Aquinas’s initial statement in opening lines of “Tractatus de homine”: that 
there are three things to be found in spiritual substances: essence, power, 
and operation (Aquinas 1947, I, q. 75, Prooemium). Aquinas clearly states 
that a distinction should be made between the essence of the soul and its 
powers (Ibid. Iª, q. 77, a. 1 co). It is the “essentia” which Murphy bypassed, 
while her research focuses on “virtus et operatio” (power and operation). 
What is the range of the achievements of understanding “virtus et operatio” 
of the soul, if thinking of “essentia” is reduced solely to the physical, as 
in the case with Murphy? What she neglected is the metaphysical level of 
the human nature. “Metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to 
anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground 
the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature.” (John 
Paul II. 1998, number 83)
But, can we even use Aquinas’s hylomorphistic image of a man, having in 
mind his theological purpose? In other words, is human body acknowledged 
as such? Aquinas states that “the theologian considers the nature of man 
in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as 
the body has relation to the soul.” (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 75 pr) That is why 
Aquinas considers the human physical body, including the brain. Under-
standing the role of brain in the human being was important for medieval 
thinkers. Although they accepted Aristotle’s philosophy; Albertus Magnus 
and Thomas Aquinas had a completely different answer for the anatomical 
and physiological role of the brain in connection with psychological activity. 
“Aristotle thought that the centre of the psyche was the heart; the Scholas-
tics, following Avicenna, believed that the brain was the organ of sensible 
psychic functions and the tool of intellective ones. They assigned in the 
brain centres various functions, which they localized in the central part and 
more precisely in the ventricula, which they supposed to be of three parts. 
The front one was taken to be the centre of sensibility and imagination; 
the rear one, the centre of memory; and the middle one, connecting the 
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other two, was considered as the seat of the sensorium commune or sensible 
consciousness.” (Marcozzi 1992, 125) 
The man as a most perfect being (Aquinas 1949, a. 8 co) has a body that 
is organized exactly for its purpose. Aquinas also stated that when we look 
at the size of the brain and the size of the body, among the animals men has 
the largest brain. The reason for this is greater freedom of the inner powers 
necessary for intellectual action, and also for the lower temperature of the 
brain necessary for regulating the heat of the heart, which is needed so that 
man would stand up straight (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 91, a. 3 ad 1). The position 
of the brain is necessarily in a good place so that the powers of the soul could 
function (Aquinas 1949, a. 8 co. Also: Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 91, a. 3 ad 3). Also, 
Aquinas explicitly claims that the soul cannot directly understand itself or 
anything else, if the brain is damaged. “If certain corporeal organs have been 
harmed, the soul cannot directly understand either itself or anything else, as 
when the brain is injured.” (Aquinas 1949, a. 2 ad 7) Furthermore, the human 
body organs exist because of the powers of the soul, rather than vice versa. 
Therefore, nature formed bodies in order for them to align with the powers 
of the soul! “For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the 
powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there 
are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety 
of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers.” (Aquinas 1947, 
Iª, q. 78, a. 3 co) Furthermore, “as nature does not fail in necessary things” 
(Ibid. Iª, q. 78, a. 4 co), in the case of the human being and his formal and 
final cause, nature has shaped the human brain harmonized with the powers 
of the soul and her function of accounting for the unity.
Although the human brain is in an advanced state and is developed 
by its fundamental shape and functions, neuronal structures never stop 
changing. If our lives are guided by our intellectual and volitional powers, 
then we can say that the rational soul animates the cerebral structures and 
simultaneously affects the behaviour of our physical basis, i.e. that the 
“spirit acts on matter” (Lejeune 1992, 24). Aquinas also believes that there 
is no obstacle against idea that some powers of the soul could be a physical 
reality (Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 76, a. 1 ad 4).
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For the activity of the rational soul, Aquinas considers that there is no 
need for a material organ to be expressed through it (Ibid. Iª, q. 78, a. 1 co). 
But mental ability still is going on in matter, because the soul represents 
the form of the body. “It is separate indeed according to its intellectual 
power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal 
organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an 
act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. 
But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, 
is the form of the body, and the term of human generation.” (Ibid. Iª, q. 76, 
a. 1 ad 1) On one side there is the strict dependence of the human soul on 
matter, while on the other side, the soul is not involved “so completely in 
matter that it loses its real nature. The soul is not intelligence, but it is 
a principle of intellectual knowledge” (Gilson 2002, 231). We believe this 
is precisely the central essence of the relationship between hylomorphism 
and neuroscientific research: a rational soul which does not need a material 
organ to express itself, and that intellectual ability itself occurs in matter 
that never stops changing.
This is also an interesting idea for the field of neuroplasticity; namely, 
the way in which the brain as an organ develops is enabled by the astonishing 
ability of its neuroplasticity. Neuroscientists state that there is a clear case 
of conformation of possible extensive neuroplasticity. “The brain changes 
induced by education are made possible by the remarkable adaptivity 
that characterizes the developing brain. It results from the fact that brain 
development is associated with a continuous formation and removal of 
neuronal connections, whereby experience determines which connections 
get consolidated.” (Battro and others 2013, 233) Neuroplasticity allows for 
development of a biological basis for the realization of the ability of reason. 
Ultimately, the whole body will be triumphed by the mind and the will 
(Aquinas 1947, Iª, q. 76, a. 8 ad 4). Neuroscientists have a lot of data about 
the “how” of the neuronal processes in the brain, but they still do not know 
“what overall purpose they serve” (Northoff 2014, XI). So, the final cause 
of the human being, Aquinas’s notion of beatitude, “with its connotations 
of meaning, fulfilment, and openness to infinite and transcendental being 
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does not appear capable of resolution at anything less than an integrationist 
account of the whole neural platform” (Larrivee and Gini 2014, 3).
The rational soul of the human being grips on the whole body and all 
its functions. As the soul is more perfect, the more numerous and diverse 
organs are needed, and therefore the organism is more complex. “For from 
this principle (the soul) which is the richest of embodied forms, spring 
many different activities, so that it requires, in the matter informed by it, 
a full equipment of different organs.” (Aquinas 1951, lib. 2 l. 1 n. 20) It is 
about a principle which, as Henrici has rightly observed, is supported by 
comparative studies of the brain (Henrici 1992, 131). On the other hand, as 
the soul is more perfect, and the organism more diversified, and the unity 
of the whole is stronger. “Because the greater the mastery of form over 
matter, the greater is the unity of that which is made from it and matter.” 
(Aquinas 1955–1957, lib. 2, cap. 68, n. 6) It is the principle of increasing 
“centro-complexity”, which Herbert Spencer and Teilhard de Chardin 
assumed as a parameter of evolution (Henrici 1992, 131).
The dynamical unity of the whole, enabled by the soul, could be the 
path for further development toward an understanding of consciousness 
(the binding problem), knowledge and self-knowledge in the frame of 
hylomorphism. Thanks to neuroimaging techniques, we can see what 
parts of our brain are active when we think or when we pray, i.e. when our 
soul expresses itself. Furthermore, when we engage in these actions we 
have a clear and strong notion of the self, to whom the possibility of these 
actions belongs. Neuroscience must not and cannot avoid the principle of 
the self-reflecting unity of the whole human being, which is profoundly 
understood and described in Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism.
Conclusion
“Videtur qoud” (“it would seem that”) is a vastly wide river dividing the bank 
of natural sciences from the other bank of river, that of understanding of 
the nature of man in the works of Thomas Aquinas.
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Do we even have the right to attempt to establish the medieval image 
of man as a guiding light leading contemporary sciences, from which we 
expect great progress? However, on the other hand, do such sciences possess 
the exclusive right to answer the question: Who is man? Also, can one build 
a philosophical and theological image of man without considering modern 
neuroscientific findings?
Such questions will lead us in the direction of the necessity of an 
interdisciplinary approach. What we have shown through the presentation 
and critique of Murphy’s research has revealed to us a few important points 
for further consideration. They offer guidance to us in the construction of 
the new-old hylomorphistic image of man that is informed by the results 
of neuroscientific research:
1. We must not forget the fact that the man, created in the image of 
God, is a mystery and even scientific enlightenment is unable to ful-
ly illuminate all corners of the human being. The absolutist demand 
of science reveals its facilities in too strong a light, which dazzles, 
and we lose sight of numerous shades of the spectrum of the human 
beings.
2. Neuroscientific investigations should be complemented with the 
philosophical and theological understanding of the functioning of 
the dynamic unity of the human being, not losing sight of the fi-
nal purpose of human beings. We have seen how areas such as con-
sciousness and the human intellect cannot even be accessed without 
the complementary approach.
3. For the purposes of a complementary approach, physicalism cannot 
meet such demands and that is why we propose Aristotelian-Thom-
istic hylomorphism, which can offer a sufficiently broad framework 
for the mystery of the human being.
4. Although the soul is the first principle of human beings, in terms of 
the brain as an organ we need to recognize its fascinating structure 
and function that needs to be seen in a light that illuminates the 
precedence of man and human dignity in line with created creatures.
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